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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Marvin Orellana-Castro appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
the jury verdicts finding him guilty of four counts of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen
years of age.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
The following facts are based on the testimony presented at trial.

S.O. (dob

lived with her mother, Silvia Orozco, and step-father, Orellana-Castro, but also
sometimes stayed with her grandparents because it was calm and she felt safe there.
(Tr., p.309, L.3 - p.311, L.13; p.326, L.21 - p.327, L.2; p.330, Ls.3-12.)

During the

summer of 2011, when S.O. and her three little brothers were being driven by OrellanaCastro to their house in Hazelton from Twin Falls, S.O. woke up from sleeping in the
front passenger seat to find that Orellana-Castro had his hand under her shirt and bra
and was touching her breast. (Tr., p.312, L.4 - p.314, L.11.) S.O. told Orellana-Castro
to "stop," pushed him away, and he told her not to get mad. (Tr., p.314, Ls.14-19.)
In the summer of 2010, S.O. was getting ready to go to a water park when
Orellana-Castro called for her to come into his bedroom so he could borrow her phone.
(Tr., p.315, Ls.4-20.) Under her clothing, S.O. was wearing a swimming suit that tied at
the neck.

(Tr., p.316, Ls.4-25.)

S.O. later returned to the bedroom to retrieve her

phone, and when she reached for it, he grabbed her arm, pulled her onto the bed, put
the covers over her and tried to get her swimming suit untied from around her neck.
(Tr., p.315, L.20 - p.318, L.14.) At the time, Orellana-Castro "just had his boxers on."
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(Tr., p.317, L.21.) S.O. elbowed Orellana-Castro hard and was able to get loose and
leave the house with her little brother. (Tr., p.316, Ls.12-16.)
S.O. testified about two uncharged incidents. First, when she was five years old
and playing hide-and-seek with her sister [G.O.], she was hiding under her mother's bed
when Orellana-Castro entered the room, locked the door, and carried her onto the bed.
(Tr., p.320, Ls.2-25; p.377, L.10- p.378, L.2.)

Orellana-Castro took S.O.'s shirt off,

leaving her without anything on top, tried to remove her clothes, and hugged her. (Tr.,
p.322, Ls.5-23; p.378, L.3 - p.379, L.4.)

Also, in August 2011, S.O. woke up one

morning to find Orellana-Castro lying on the other end of her bed with a shirt in his
hand.

(Tr., p.327, L.14 - p.329, L.20.)

S.O. asked Orellana-Castro, "What are you

doing here?" and thought it was not right that he was in her bed. (Tr., p.328, Ls.12-16.)
Orellana-Castro told S.O. he wanted her to go to court with him, and S.O. began crying
because she was scared, and told him she couldn't go with him because her stomach
hurt. (Tr., p.327, L.14 - p. 329, L.8.) Orellana-Castro told S.O., "'Don't tell you mom
because she will get mad."' (Tr., p.331, Ls.20-22.)
G.O.

is S.O.'s older sister. (Tr., p.554, Ls.5-8; p.556, Ls.22-23.)

G.O. testified that in January 2011, she was lying down on her bed in her bedroom
when Orellana-Castro came into the room, laid down next to her, and started hugging
and grabbing her legs, chest, and everything with his hands. (Tr., p.560, L.15 - p.561,
L.5.)

Orellana-Castro took both his and G.O.'s clothing off and engaged in vaginal

intercourse with his penis, and touched her vagina with his fingers. (Tr., p.561, L.16 p.562, L.5.) Afterward, Orellana-Castro told G.O. to not tell her mother, as G.O. cried
and covered up. (Tr., p.563, Ls.6-8.) G.O. did not immediately tell anybody about the
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incident because she was scared and Orellana-Castro warned her not to tell.

(Tr.,

p.563, L.23 - p.564, L.3.) G.O. testified that Orellana-Castro raped her again in July
2010 in his bedroom, by taking her clothes off, tightly grabbing her and penetrating her
vagina with his penis and by putting his penis "inside [her] butt[,]" and touching her
breasts and legs. (Tr., p.564, L.6 - p.567, L.11.) He then "told [her] the same things he
told [her] last time." (Tr., p.567, Ls.12-14.)
In August 2011, S.O. told her Aunt, Yolanda Orozco, that Orellana-Castro had
sexually abused her.

(Tr., p.288, Ls.6-9; p.293, Ls.13-23; p.330, L.23

p.331, L.8.)

Yolanda called her sister, Deysi Orozco, and, after they talked with S.O. and G.O.'s
mother, Silvia, Yolanda drove Silvia and the children to the Crisis Center, but Silvia did
not stay there after being interviewed by a social worker, choosing to go home instead.
(Tr., p.290, L.16 - p.293, L.18; p.297, L.9 - p.298, L.6; p.336, L.13 - p.340, L.16.) Prior
to going to the Crisis Center, Silvia drove to some apartments by a lake and talked to
Orellana-Castro as he stood outside the car. (Tr., p.337, L.15 - p.338, L.8.) S.O. heard
Orellana-Castro ask Silvia "not to say what happened, that he would fix it and not to tell
anybody about it or he would kill himself," and Silvia said, "Move, I'm leaving," and then
drove back to their house before going with Yolanda to the Crisis Center. (Tr., p.338,
L.9 - p.339, L.5.) G.O. also recalled that, just before Silvia went to the Crisis Center
with Yolanda, they had contact with Orellana-Castro:
My mom was screaming at him and telling him what did he do to my sister,
and he was saying, "It's not true. It's not true. I never did anything to her."
And then he had - he went in the back of the house, and he had a knife,
and he said he was going to kill himself, and he said it was going to be our
fault if his kids didn't see him no more.
(Tr., p.580, Ls.17-24.)
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In October 30, 2011, while staying at a friend's house, G.O. made disclosures to
her friend's mother, Tania Nelson, and the following day Ms. Nelson went to the school
and talked to the school counselor about the information she had received from G.O.
(Tr., p.397, L.11 - p.400, L.9; p.573, L.4.)
In regard to G.O., the state charged Orellana-Castro with two counts of lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age and two counts of sexual abuse of a
child under sixteen years of age; the state also charged him with two counts of sexual
abuse of a child under sixteen years of age regarding S.O.

(Id.)

At trial, a jury

convicted Orellana-Castro of all four counts of sexual abuse, but could not reach
verdicts on the lewd conduct counts.

(R., pp. 382-385.)

The court subsequently

imposed concurrent unified 15-year sentences with five years fixed on all four counts.
(R., pp.469-476.) Orellana-Castro filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.484-487.)
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ISSUES
Orellana-Castro states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Orellana-Castro's
Motion To Sever and Motion for Relief From Prejudicial Joinder
because the charges were not properly joined?

2.

Did the district court err when it failed to provide a proper remedy
once it learned that the court appointed interpreter was knowingly
providing inaccurate and incomplete interpretation of witnesses'
testimony?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it did not allow Mr.
Orellana-Castro to present evidence that G.O.'s psychological
issues may have been the result of an uncharged sexual trauma, a
nonconsensual sexual encounter with Jose?

4.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr.
Orellana-Castro's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of
law violated because the accumulation of errors deprived him of his
right to a fair trial?

(Appellant's Brief, p.12.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Orellana-Castro failed to establish the district court erred in declining to
sever the charges for separate trials?
2.
Has Orellana-Castro failed to show error in the district court's denial of his motion
for a mistrial based on the interpreter's failure to interpret Maria Orozco's testimony
verbatim because the court gave Orellana-Castro the opportunity to re-present the
testimony and Orellana-Castro declined?
3.
Has Orellana-Castro failed to show error in the district court's denial of his motion
to admit evidence pursuant to I.RE. 412?
4.

Has Orellana-Castro failed to show cumulative error?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Orellana-Castro Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Sever
A.

Introduction
The state charged Orellana-Castro with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor

under sixteen and two counts of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen against G.O.
when she was thirteen and fourteen years old, and with two counts of sexual abuse
against S.O. when she was eleven and twelve years of age. (R., pp.69-72.) Prior to
trial, Orellana-Castro filed a motion to sever pursuant to Rules 8(a) 1 and 14, I.C.R.,
asserting the charges were prejudicially joined because they (1) occurred at different
times and places, (2) were totally unrelated, (3) involved different victims, (4) did not
show a common plan or scheme, and (5) did not fall within I.RE. 404(b). (R., pp.112113.)
At the hearing on his motion, Orellana-Castro argued that the charges in his case
should be severed because they did not show a common scheme or plan to sexually
abuse G.O. and S.O., his stepdaughters, in his home. (Tr., p.40, L.15 - p.41, L.6.) The
district court denied Orellana-Castro's motion to sever, concluding that, "overall the
evidence is sufficient to constitute a common scheme or plan[,]" and any prejudice
would be alleviated by an instruction to the jury to decide each count separately without
being influenced by other counts. (R., pp.152-155; Tr., p.41, L.7 - p.43, L.20.)

1

Although Orellana-Castro's motion to sever was specifically based on I.C.R. 14, his
supporting brief, and more significantly, the district court's analysis at the motion
hearing, were based also on determining, pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a), whether joinder was
appropriate in the first instance. (R., pp.123-126; Tr., p.41, Ls.13-22.)
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On appeal, Orellana-Castro argues the district court erred in denying his request
to sever the offenses because, he contends, (1) "the charges involving G.O. and S.O.
were improperly joined because the offenses do not constitute a common plan or
scheme" under I.RE. 8(a), and (2) under I.RE. 14, "even if the charges were properly
joined ... [his] motion to sever should have been granted because of the prejudice he
suffered as [a] result of the charges being tried together." (Appellant's Brief, pp.16, 21.)
Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case shows the district
court did not err in determining that joinder of the offenses was appropriate, nor did it
abuse its discretion in denying Orellana-Castro's motion to sever on the basis of
prejudice.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to !.C.R. 8 is a question of

law, over which this Court exercises free review." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564565, 165 P.3d 273, 278-279 (2007). "In contrast, an abuse of discretion standard is
applied when reviewing the denial of a motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14;
however, that rule presumes joinder was proper in the first place."

~

When reviewing

a discretionary decision, this Court considers:
(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason.
State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 907-08, 55 P.3d 896, 900-01 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing
Statev. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).
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C.

Orellana-Castro Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Joining
Offenses
Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) states:
Joinder of offenses. Two (2) or more offenses may be charged
on the same complaint, indictment or information and a separate count for
each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors
or both, are based on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more
acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan.
Whether joinder is proper is "determined by what is alleged, not what the proof

eventually shows[,]" and the court is not limited to consideration of the charging
document. Field, 144 Idaho at 565, 165 P.3d at 279 and n.3.
After hearing Orellana-Castro's motion to sever the joinder of the two sexual
abuse charges relating to S.O. from the four charges (two lewd conduct and two sexual
abuse) pertaining to G.O., the district court concluded the two sets of charges showed a
common scheme or plan under I.C.R. 8(a), explaining:
The court basically has a two-step analysis. First of all, the court
must find, in regards to Rule 8 and Rule 14, that joinder is permissible.
The court would either have to find that there is sufficient evidence
to suggest that the acts charged arose out of the same conduct or
transaction or are sufficient to constitute a common plan or scheme, and
then the court must weigh the prejudice to the defendant by allowing
joinder.
The court is aware that the issue of joinder has been discussed in
State versus Field at 144 Idaho 559.
It was also discussed in
Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89.
The court is aware that the Supreme Court in State versus Field did
find that joinder was improper because there wasn't a sufficient showing of
a common scheme or plan to warrant joinder. However, this case, I think,
is a little bit different and more closely is viewed similar to that in
Schwartzmiller.
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In this case you have the two victims who are step-sisters or stepdaughters of the defendant. They are both vr:;ry close in age. They both
allege to having been abused in the home. Five of the six counts involve
the alleged abuse occurring within the home.
The sixth count is alleged to have occurred within the family
vehicle. There were two brothers present who, apparently, are alleged to
have been asleep in the back of the vehicle. This -- Both of the daughters
are close in age. The incidents occurred at different times and dates, but
during the period of 2010 and 2011.
Certainly, the sexual abuse of G.O. is somewhat different than S.O.
The charges against the defendant involving G.O. involve genital, genital
contact; whereas, the contact with S.O. involves sexual touching.
However, the court does believe that overall the evidence is
sufficient to constitute a common scheme or plan.
(Tr., p.41, L.13 - p.43, L.4.)

In sum, the district court found the following factors

indicative of a common scheme or plan by Orellana-Castro to sexually abuse G.O. and
S.O.:

(1) the girls are his stepdaughters, (2) both girls lived in his home at various

times, and during the times of the offenses, (3) the girls are close in age, 2 (4) five out of
the six offenses occurred in his home, and (5) the offenses occurred during 2010 and
2011.
Not only did Orellana-Castro sexually molest both G.O. and S.O. during that twoyear span, but, unbeknownst to them, he had them take turns in providing him whatever
sexual benefit he sought by his actions. The first offense committed upon S.O. (Count
V -- sexual abuse) took place in 2010 between May 15th and September 15th , and the
first offenses against G.O. (Counts Ill and IV -- lewd conduct and sexual abuse)
happened in July 2010 -- during the same four month period. (R., pp.70-71.) Orellana-

At the time of trial, G.O. was 15 years old, and S.O. was 13 years of age. (Tr., p.309,
Ls.3-4; p.554, Ls.5-6.) The prosecutor also noted that G.O. and S.O. are sisters who
are close in size and only one grade apart in school. (Tr., p.36, Ls.2-7.)
2
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Castro's second set of offenses against G.O. (Counts I and II -- lewd conduct and
sexual abuse) happened during January 2011, after he first sexually abused S.O. in
2010, but before he sexually abused S.O. again in August 2011.

(Id.)

Further, If

Orellana-Castro's July 2010 lewd conduct and sexual abuse offenses (Counts Ill and IV)
were committed before he first sexually abused S.O. (alleged to have occurred between
May 15 th and September 15th of 2010), the alternating pattern of molestations would be
even more apparent and complete-- first molesting G.O., then S.O, then G.O., and
finally, S.O.

Orellana-Castro's back-and-forth pattern of sexually molesting S.O. and

G.O. during the same two-year period adds credence to the district court's conclusion
that he had a common scheme or plan to sexually abuse his two step-daughters when
they were living with him. Moreover, although the two lewd conduct Counts (regarding
G.O.) were admittedly dissimilar to the other four Counts, there were some similarities
amongst the remaining Counts.

Counts II and IV (re: G.O.), and Count VI (re: S.O.)

allege Orellana-Castro used his hands to touch G.O.'s body and S.O.'s breasts.
pp.70-72.)

(R.,

Also, Counts II and IV allege he took G.O.'s clothes off, and Count V

similarly alleges he was "attempting to undo [S.O.'sJ swim suit top." (R., pp.70-71.)
Based on the above factors, the district court's finding that Orellana-Castro
engaged in a common scheme or plan to sexually abuse G.O. and S.O. was
appropriate, and was not simply based on "the bare fact that sexual misconduct has
occurred with children in the past." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668, 227 P.3d
918, 922 (2010).

Given the above factors, as well as Orellana-Castro's pattern of

alternating between molesting G.O. and S.O. within a two-year period, his offenses
were "linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely showing a criminal
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propensity and instead ... objectively tend to establish that the same person committed
all the acts."

&

Orellana-Castro has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred

in finding his offenses demonstrated a common scheme or plan; therefore the offenses
were properly joined for trial under I.C.R. 8(a).

D.

Orellana-Castro Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion
In Denying His Motion To Sever
Regardless of whether the initial joinder of offenses was proper under I.C.R. 8(a),

Orellana-Castro has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his motion to sever the joined offenses. Idaho Criminal Rule 14 provides, in
relevant part:

If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of
offenses or of defendants in a complaint, indictment or information or by
such joinder for trial together, the court may order the state to elect
between counts, grant separate trials of counts, grant a severance of
defendants, or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
"When reviewing an order denying a motion to sever, the inquiry on appeal is
whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted
from a joint trial, which denied the defendant a fair trial." Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 901, 55
P.3d at 908 (citing State v. Cierelli, 115 Idaho 732, 734, 769 P.2d 609, 611 (Ct. App.
1989)).

The "potential sources of prejudice" that have been recognized by Idaho's

appellate courts include:
(a) the possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence,
rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (b) the potential
that the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (c) the
possibility that the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime
and then find him or her guilty of the other simply because of his or her
criminal disposition, i.e. he or she is a bad person.
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Eguilior at 908, 55 P.3d at 901 (citation omitted).
Orellana-Castro argues that the failure to sever his case resulted in prejudice
"because of the credibility issues involved in this trial, a he said she said case, that had
the charges been separated, the verdicts may have been different." (Appellant's Brief,
p.22.)

This argument fails not only because it is speculative, but also because the

district court instructed the jury that it was not to allow any one Count of the Information
to have any influence upon its decision in regard to any other Count. (Tr., p.1021, Ls.16; R., p.365 (Instr. No. 21.) Prior to the jury's deliberations, the court instructed it:
Each count charges a separate and distinct offense. You must
decide each count separately on the evidence and the law that applies to
it uninfluenced by your decision as to any other count. The defendant
may be found guilty or not guilty of any or all of the offenses charged.
(Tr., p.1021, Ls.1-6.) The jury also received an identically worded limiting instruction in
writing. (R., p.365.)
The limiting instruction given to the jury prevented whatever prejudice may have
accrued to Orellana-Castro as a result of the fact that he was charged with committing
separate sexual offenses against G.O. and S.O.

See Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 909, 55

P.3d at 902 (rejecting claim that court erred in denying motion to sever, noting, in part,
the court's instructions and the presumption that the jury followed those instructions).
Orellana-Castro fails to explain why the instructions were inadequate in this regard.
Indeed, he makes no mention of the limiting instruction in the context of his argument
that the court erred in denying his motion to sever. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.21-22.)
Instead, Orellana-Castro contends that "[hJearing testimony from both girls is
tantamount to presenting character evidence which is normally excluded due to well
founded fears that a jury may find a defendant guilty based upon the idea that if he had
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done something before he is more likely to do it again, acting in conformity with his
character to engage in bad acts."

(Id., p.22.)

However, Orellana-Castro has not

"presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted from a joint trial, which
denied the defendant a fair trial." Eguilior, 137 Idaho at 901, 55 P.3d at 908. OrellanaCastro has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to sever under I.C.R. 14.

11.
Orellana-Castro Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion
For A Mistrial Based On The Interpreter's Failure To Interpret Verbatim Because The
Court Gave Orellana-Castro The Opportunity To Re-Present The Testimony And
Orellana-Castro Declined
A.

Introduction
During trial, it was discovered that the interpreter, Mr. Hale, had not interpreted,

verbatim, parts of the testimony of Maria Orozco (hereinafter "Maria"), the grandmother
of S.O. and G.O.

(Tr., p.712, Ls.5-17; p.775, L.18 - p.776, L.17.) The district court

placed Mr. Hale under oath outside the presence of the jury, and after the court and
defense counsel questioned him, the court determined there were two instances where
Hale had not interpreted Maria's testimony word-for-word. 3 (Tr., p.776, L.18 - p.783,
L.9.)

Toward the end of the impromptu hearing on Hale's flawed interpretation of

Maria's testimony, the district court gave Orellana-Castro's attorney an opportunity to
"correct the record" by recalling Maria to testify again, an offer which defense counsel
subsequently said he appreciated, but declined, favoring to make a motion for mistrial.

3

The two instances involved questions to Maria Orozco about the truthfulness of G.O.,
in which (1) Maria went "off into incidents in the past and then kind of generally
editorialize[d] on her opinion[,]" and (2) Maria answered a question the same way
several times, but Mr. Hale gave the answer only once. (Tr., p.778, L.21 - p.779, L.25;
p.781, L.24 - p.783, L.9.)
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(Tr., p.781, Ls.4-23; p.783, L.16 - p.784, L.8.)

The court denied Orellana-Castro's

motion for mistrial, ruling:
... As far as the motion for mistrial, certainly, whether or not to
grant a mistrial is also a matter of discretion for the trial court.

Certainly, overall, considering the testimony as a whole, the court is
convinced that the testimony that she conveyed to the jury was that she
found the defendant to be a good person, that she found [G.O.] to be
someone who is untruthful. Certainly, I think that was conveyed clearly to
the jury.

What I do know is the purpose of her testimony was to challenge
the credibility of [G.O.] and to support the character of the defendant. I
think overall her testimony has come out in that fashion.
Clearly, at this point in time the court does not find that there is -while I would agree that the lack of verbatim translation should never have
occurred, the court at this time, based on the state of the record, cannot
say that the lack of verbatim translation was prejudicial to the defendant
absent a further offer of proof as to perhaps what testimony was not
verbatimly translated as to how that might have further bolstered the
testimony of Maria Orozco. And so at this time the court would deny the
motion for mistrial without prejudice to the defense renewing the motion at
a later date on a further offer of proof.
(Tr., p.786, L.8 - p.788, L.3.)
On appeal, Orellana-Castro contends "the district court erred when it failed to
provide a proper remedy" once it determined that the interpreter had not interpreted
Maria's testimony verbatim. (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-23.) Specifically, Orellana-Castro
"asserts that the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial" and,
despite the court's offer to re-call the witness, asserts that because "the district court
failed to provide any other reasonable opportunity to correct the interpretation error,
granting a mistrial was the only way to remedy this issue." (Id., p.31.)
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Although the interpreter clearly failed to carry out his duty to faithfully interpret
Maria's testimony, Orellana-Castro has failed to show that the court abused its
discretion by denying his motion for mistrial after it offered Orellana-Castro the
opportunity to re-call the witness, or that any of his federal or state constitutional rights
were violated. 4

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal, the standard for review of a motion for mistrial is well-established:
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of the circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the
event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible
error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion
for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion"
standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of
reversible error. [The appellate court's] focus is upon the continuing
impact on the trial of the incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The
trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that
incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error.

State v. Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57, 855 P.2d 891, 894 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations
omitted). Orellana-Castro bears the burden of showing that the trial court committed
reversible error when it denied his motion for a mistrial. State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho
30, 674 P.2d 1029 (Ct. App. 1983).

The appellate court reviews the full record to

determine if the event that triggered the motion for mistrial "represented reversible error
when viewed in the context of the full record." Rodriquez, 106 Idaho at 33, 674 P.2d at
1032.

Orellana-Castro alleges violations of his rights to due process, a fair trial, a jury trial,
to compel witnesses, to present a defense, and to an impartial trial under the Fifth, Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and Article 1, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-30.)
4
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The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such as a
claimed due process violation is one of deference to factual findings, unless they are
clearly erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements have been
satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 841, 118 P.3d 160,
173 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

C.

Orellana-Castro Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of
His Motion For A Mistrial, Or That His Constitutional Rights Were Violated By
The District Court's Remedy For The Interpreter's Error
A mistrial is appropriate where there has been conduct, inside or outside of the

courtroom, that is "prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial."
I.C.R. 29.1 (a). Thus, the event triggering the mistrial motion must be both prejudicial
and deprive the defendant of a fair trial in order to warrant a mistrial. To show that he
was denied a fair trial, Orellana-Castro must show that he was prejudiced by the district
court's failure to attempt to remedy the interpreter's error.
Orellana-Castro repeatedly argues that the district court provided no proper
remedy to the interpreter's failure to provide a verbatim translation of Maria's testimony,
and therefore, a mistrial should have been granted. (Appellant's Brief, pp.23-31.) He
variously states:
(1)

"The district court determined from the interpreter's testimony that
the jury was provided with the gist of Ms. Orozco's testimony and
determined that nothing further was necessary[,]" id., p.23;

(2)

"The district court erred when it failed to provide a proper
remedy[,]" id.;

(3)

"the district court had a duty to provide an appropriate remedy" and
it "should have corrected the errorf,]" id., p.27;
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(4)

"failure to provide a remedy implicated Mr. Orellana-Castro's
constitutional rights" and "failing to cure the interpretation error
resulted in" violations of his constitutional rights, id., p.28;

(5)

"[a]n inaccurate interpretation cannot be properly resolved by the
district court ignoring the issue" and the district court "failed to
provide any workable opportunities to correct the error or declare a
mistrial[,]" id., pp.29-30;

(6)

"the district court chose to allow for the violation of Mr. OrellanaCastro's rights and attempted to sweep the issue under the rug by
declaring, based solely on the testimony of Mr. Hale, that the jury
heard enough to the defense witness's testimony to get the gist of
her proffered testimony[,]" id., p.30;

(7)

"it was error when the district court failed to properly address the
interpretation issue and failed to provide a remedy to correct the
error[,]" id.; and

(8)

"because the district court failed to provide any other reasonable
opportunity to correct the interpretation error, granting a mistrial
was the only way to remedy the issue[,]" id., p.31.

(Emphasis added.) Orellana-Castro's persistent argument that the district court did not
provide a reasonable remedy to correct the interpreter's error could not be more
misplaced.
After the district court determined that the interpreter had not provided a verbatim
translation of one part of Maria's testimony, and had him promise to translate
"everything verbatim," defense counsel said that he hated to call Maria "and go through
all that again." (Tr., p.780, L.20 - p.781, L.7.) The court responded, "Well [defense
counsel], I'm affording you the opportunity to correct the record if you wish to correct the

record."

(Tr., p.781, Ls.8-10 (emphasis added).)

Defense counsel subsequently

acknowledged the court's offer to recall Maria as a witness, but opted to move for a
mistrial instead:
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Your Honor, I cannot waive the -- waive the objection, but -- And I
appreciate the court's offer to let me recall her, but the, you know, I was
going to have to go through all that testimony again to be sure, and I
wonder if that isn't a basis for a motion for a mistrial in this.
I, frankly, I don't know what to do, but I feel -- I feel like the failure to
-- My client has indicated that there were several instances, but without
specific reference I cannot make a representation to the court as to what
they were. But it didn't just relate to -- It did not just relate to the issue of
her reputation for truthfulness. It was even more than that.
But I think I will, just for the record, Your Honor, I think I will make a
motion for mistrial.
(Tr., p. 783, L.16 - p.784, L.8 (emphasis added).)
The above record shows that, contrary to Orellana-Castro's argument, the district
court did, in fact, give him a reasonable and full opportunity to correct the record by
recalling Maria as a witness -- but defense counsel chose not to do so.

By giving

Orellana-Castro an open invitation to recall Maria to testify, the court took reasonable
steps to protect all the rights Orellana-Castro now claims were violated -- his rights to
due process, a fair trial, a jury trial, to compel witnesses, to present a defense, and to an
impartial trial. (Appellant's Brief, pp.28-30.) In essence, Orellana-Castro decided not to
present Maria as a witness a second time, choosing to exclude whatever testimony she
may have provided; neither the district court nor the interpreter interfered with those trial
decisions. Orellana-Castro' has failed to show that any of his constitutional rights were
violated.
Inasmuch as the district court gave Orellana-Castro an unrestricted opportunity
to recall Maria as a witness, he has also failed to show the court erred in denying his
motion for mistrial because he has not demonstrated that the interpreter's mistake
affected his ability to present Maria's testimony, or that the interpreter's mistake
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"represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record." Rodriquez,
106 Idaho at 33,674 P.2d at 1032.

111.
Orellana-Castro Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motion
To Admit Evidence Pursuant To I.R.E. 412

A

Introduction
Orellana-Castro argues that the district court erred by failing to permit him,

pursuant to I. R. E. 412(b )(2)(A), 5 to present evidence at trial showing that a man named
Jose drugged and raped G.O. at a quinceanera party on October 8, 2011, and that
G.O.'s emotional trauma, as established by various state's witnesses, was due, at least
in part, to that rape.

5

(Appellant's Brief, pp.32-42.)

Orellana-Castro's argument fails

I.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A) currently reads in relevant part:
Rule 412. Sex crime cases; relevance of victim's past behavior.
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of a sex crime, reputation or opinion evidence of the
past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such sex crime is not
admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of a sex crime, evidence of a victim's past sexual
behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible,
unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is-

(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused,
offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was
or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or
injury; ...
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because (1) he failed to preserve the issue for appeal because his offer of proof to the
district court did not show he could present admissible evidence establishing that Jose
raped G.O., or any connection between the alleged rape and G.O.'s emotional trauma,
(2) the court correctly denied the motion on the basis that I.RE. 412(b)(2)(A) requires a
physical injury in order to present evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior, and (3)
even if the court erred by excluding such evidence, such error was harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. State
v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003).
question of law and is thus reviewed de novo.

kl

However, relevancy is a

When reviewing a trial court's

discretionary decision, an appellate court considers whether the lower court (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the bounds of that discretion
and consistent with applicable legal standards to the choices before it; and (3) reached
its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d
1331, 1333 (1989).
Interpretation of court rules is a question of law reviewed de nova. See State v.
Moore, 131 Idaho 814,821,965 P.2d 174,181 (1998).
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C.

Orellana-Castro Failed To Preserve His Claim For Appeal Because He Did Not
Provide An Adequate Offer Of Proof
Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a) provides in relevant part that "[e]rror may not be

predicated upon a ruling which ... excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected, and ... the substance of the evidence was made known to the court
by offer or was apparent from the context within which questions were asked." l.R.
103(a). The purpose of this rule is two-fold. First, by making an offer of proof the trial
court is given an opportunity to carefully consider the factual and legal reasons for
admitting the proffered evidence.

United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir.

2001 ), cert. den. 535 U.S. 978 (2002) (discussing in detail the purpose for federal Rule
of Evidence 103(a)(2), which is identical to Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2)). Second,
absent an offer of proof, the appellate court cannot adequately determine whether there
was error or whether the rights of the party offering the evidence have been prejudiced.
State v. Schoonover, 125 Idaho 953, 954, 877 P.2d 924, 925 (Ct. App. 1994).
The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that an inadequate offer of proof
is not sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal. State v. Parker, 112 Idaho 1, 2, 730
P.2d 921, 922 (1987) ("To properly review a challenged denial of evidence, this court
must know exactly what evidence the lower court denied. Such an offer must include
evidence of all the specific facts which the proffered testimony tends to establish, rather
than mere 'argumentative conclusions."'); Boise Assn. of Credit Men v. Insurance Co.,
44 Idaho 249, 261, 256 P. 523, 526 (1927) ("An offer cannot be made in general terms,
but must be so made as to give the court an opportunity to rule on the specific
testimony, and must embrace all the facts showing the admissibility of the evidence,
and must be of facts, and not conclusions"(emphasis added).)
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Defense counsel did not make an adequate offer of proof of what evidence he
believed supported his contention that Jose had raped G.O.

Rather, he simply

represented that he intended to offer evidence through G.O. and her mother, Mrs.
Orellana.

(Tr., p.768, Ls.13-14.)

In the initial segment of defense counsel's offer of

proof, he stated:
Your Honor, at this time I want to make a motion to offer proof of
past sexual behavior of [G.O.] pursuant to Rule 412 of the Idaho Rules of
Evidence, and I make this following offer of proof in support of that motion .
. . . that on October 8, 2011 at a quinceanera party held at Radio
Rondezvous [sic] ... [G.O.] had sex with a man named Jose, and I
believe his name was Madigradas.
At the time the information I have is that the sex was obtained by
Jose's use of some drink which caused her to lose consciousness or to be
dizzy and that she was unaware of what he was doing. That after it was
over, Jose told her that they had sex, that [G.O.] had admitted that she
had sex with Jose, that [G.O.] was always -- that although [G.O.] has had
problems in the past, those problems have magnified since this incident
with Jose and her symptomatology has increased and become worse, and
that's in the form of the symptoms of anxiety, sleeplessness, anger, and all
of those other factors that have been testified to.
The common theme of the state's CARES witnesses, including Dr.
Yavruian and Jason Beard, seems to me to be that she has been injured
and suffers from post traumatic stress or post traumatic stress syndrome.

This evidence is offered to explain her injury, as stated by these
people, and is -- and its resulting effect. The defendant intends to offer
this evidence through Mrs. Orellana and [G.O.].
(Tr., p.766, L.22 - p.768, L.14.)
The prosecutor responded, "[t]hat statement was made by Silvia, the mother, not
made by [G.O.], so I don't think that there had [sic] been that admission[,]" and that
there has "been no demonstration that there has been an increase in her activities
afterwards or after this alleged October incident ... or any particular change in her
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symptoms." (Tr., p.768, L.19 - p. 769, L.4.) The prosecutor also argued that the injury
contemplated by I.R.E. 412 must be a physical injury, and commented that the attempt
to present such testimony "was just an attempt ... to get [G.O.'s] other sexual activity
before the jury," and objected to the motion.

(Tr., p. 769, Ls.5-10; p.770, Ls.8-11.)

Defense counsel replied that his purpose in introducing such testimony was to "help
explain why [G.O.] is suffering from these various factors that they [the state's experts]
have testified to[.]" (Tr., p.770, Ls.13-24.) Counsel further explained:
In addition to that, Your Honor, [G.O.] herself has stated, at least in
the information that I have, and I intend to call her again, that she didn't
know or she didn't realize that she was having sex, that he gave her this
drink and it was an involuntary -- sort of an involuntary event with her.
And I'm not saying that she did it consensually. What I'm saying is
that this was really in a sense a rape. And when -- What I believe is that
when it was over, that my evidence will show that her symptomology
increased and did become more severe, and that for that reason it has to
be related to that particular event.
(Tr., p.770, L.25 - p.771, L.13.) Defense counsel never explained: whether he had
talked to G.O. or how he knew she would testify that Jose raped her; how G.O.'s mother
would be able to provide non-hearsay testimony about the alleged rape; what
information counsel had to support his claim, with admissible evidence, that Jose raped
G.O., and; what admissible evidence he had showing G.O.'s trauma symptoms
increased after the alleged rape by Jose.

Defense counsel's "offer of proof' was

nothing more than pure conjecture which lacked any showing of admissible evidence to
support it.
Moreover, the entire offer of proof -- that Jose raped G.O. -- made on July 18,
2012, was inexplicably inconsistent with another offer of proof to admit Rule 412
testimony presented to the trial court just five days earlier, on July 13, 2012. On that
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day, during G.O.'s testimony, defense counsel informed the court, "I may have to touch
on some of the material that is involved in the matter that involves the offer of proof and
the 412 motion." (Tr., p.604, Ls.17-21.) After the court excused the jury, counsel said:
Your Honor, I'm at a point where I want to inquire of [G.O.] about
the events that occurred at the quinceanera held by the Partidas on
October 8th , 2011, and her relationship with a Jose Madigragas, or
whatever his name is. And I don't need -- I don't necessarily need to go
into the sexual aspect, but I want to inquire about that event ....
(Tr., p.605, Ls.3-22.) The court informed counsel that it still hadn't heard what counsel
expected the relevant testimony to be (Tr., p.606, Ls.4-5), and counsel explained that
the testimony was relevant on the issue of G.O.'s credibility and motive, and for making
a false disclosure (Tr., p.606, Ls.1-3). Counsel made the following offer of proof:
The relevant testimony that we believe is that she had this
boyfriend named Jose Madigragas that she met or had something to do
with at the Partida quinceanera; that Jose came to visit her, and her
mother turned her away -- turned him away without informing [G.O.] that
this was going -- that he was there; and that after that, she became highly
upset and told her mother that she was going to pay for this, and two days
later, this charge was made by [G.O.]. And I think that it establishes not
only -- it deals not only with her credibility, but it particularly involves her
motive for doing it.
(Tr., p.606, Ls.6-18.) Moments later, defense counsel stated, "This was the final thrust
of her effort to separate her father and mother, and our view in this case -- or her
stepfather and her mother, and it provides evidence of the motive of this young woman
for doing what she did. And the evidence is critical to our case, our defense." (Tr.,
p.607, L.22 - p.608, L.3.)
Defense counsel's first offer of proof represented that G.O. and Jose were in a
boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, and after Jose was turned away by G.O.'s mother, G.O.
took revenge against her mother by making false allegations of sexual abuse against
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Orellana-Castro.

However, five days later, the offer of proof changed dramatically to

allege that Jose had drugged and raped G.O. at the quinceanera party -- without any
explanation about how such new information was obtained or how it would be
admissible at trial.
The unsupported, conclusory, and inconsistent (with the first offer of proof)
nature of Orellana-Castro's second offer of proof failed to show that counsel could
support the factual basis of his claim with admissible evidence. As a result, the offer of
proof was inadequate to preserve Orellana-Castro's claim of error.

D.

The District Court Correctly Denied Orellana-Castro's Motion To Introduce
Evidence Of G.O.'s Past Sexual Behavior Under I.RE. 412(b)(2)(A)
After considering whether I.RE. 412(b)(2)(A)'s reference to "injury" included an

emotional injury, the district court concluded:
412 talks about the first exception, talks about the presence of
injury or semen. Clearly, in this court's view, what the legislature [sic] is
talking about is physical evidence, not emotional evidence.
Clearly, the question is whether or not the state is presenting
evidence of an injury to support the claim. The court does not believe that
the legislature [sic] intended, and our courts have held -- have not held
that the defense can create such a scenario to allow for the introduction of
412 evidence.

[T]he state has not elected to put on ... evidence of physical injury.
And absence [sic] such evidence of physical injury by the state, in the
court's view, the prior sexual relationship or the sexual relationship of Jose
and [G.O.] after the alleged conduct in July of 2010 and January of 2011,
would not be relevant under 412, and the court would therefore deny the
admission of 412 evidence at this time.
(Tr., p.774, L.11 - p.775, L.15.)
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On appeal, Orellana-Castro "asserts that the word 'injury' is not limited in the
Rule to encompass only physical injuries and that in interpreting I.RE. 412 the Court
should find that psychological injuries are also contemplated by the use of the word
'injury.'"

(Appellant's Brief, p.38.)

Orellana-Castro specifically argues that the plain

language of the rule "does not limit the types of injuries for which evidence can be
offered under the exception[,]" and if the rule "were meant to include only physical
injuries, the word physical could have been easily included[,]" as it is in the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which refers to "other physical evidence." (Appellant's Brief, pp.3839.)
Orellana-Castro correctly concludes that, under the current version of F.R.E. 412,
the injury must be a "physical" injury. 6 However, a physical injury was required under
F.R.E. 412 even before the "or other physical evidence" language was adopted by the
1994 amendments to that rule. As explained in United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601,
603 n.2 (8 th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988), prior to the 1994
amendments:
We also reject Shaw's argument that the government's evidence of
S.A.'s emotional state created an issue of the source of an "injury" under
subdivision (b)(2)(A). Shaw failed to raise this matter in his pretrial
motion. Furthermore, it is clear that Rule 412's injury exception does not

6

The "exceptions" provision of F.R.E. 412 currently reads in part:
(1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence
in a criminal case:

(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual behavior, if
offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the
source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence;
(Emphasis added.)
26

apply to emotional injuries unaccompanied by a cognizable physical
consequence. See 124 Cong.Rec. 34913 (1978) (subdivision (b)(2)(A)
applies to "certain physical consequences").

United States v. Bear Stops, 997 F.2d 451, 455 n.2 (8 th Cir. 1993) (quoting Shaw, 824
F .2d at 603 n .2) ("This court has previously found that the 'Rule 412's injury requirement
exception does not apply to emotional injuries unaccompanied by cognizable physical
consequence."').

Based on Shaw and its reliance upon the Congressional Record's

characterization of F.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A) as applying to "certain physical consequences,"
the requirement that there be a physical injury in order to fall within the exception of
F.R.E. 412's rape shield has long since been followed under the federal rules.
When Idaho adopted its Rules of Evidence in 1985, the relevant provisions of
F.R.

412(b)(2)(A)7 and I.R.

412(b)(2)(A) 8 were not just similar, they were identical.

According to Shaw, 824 F.2d at 603-604 n.3, prior to being first amended in 1994
(see Advisory Committee Notes to F.R.E. 412), F.R.E. 412 read in relevant part:

7

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit
rape, reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an
alleged victim of such rape or assault is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in
which a person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit
rape, evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or
opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such evidence other than
reputation or opinion evidence is-

(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by
the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with
respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
8

The 1985 version of Idaho Rule of Evidence 412 read in relevant part:
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When drafting the Idaho Rules of Evidence in 1985, the Idaho State Bar
Evidence Committee applied certain criteria designed to promote consistency with the
Federal Rules of Evidence ("F.R.E."). The committee explained·
The Committee concluded that the numbering system of the Federal
Rules should be followed for ease of reference and research. It was also
determined that when only minor grammatical differences existed between
the Federal Rules and the Uniform Rules, the language and punctuation of
the Federal Rules was followed to facilitate the use of the decisions of the
federal courts and those state courts which have adopted the Federal
Rules verbatim. The Committee also had in mind the desire of the Idaho
practitioners for one set of rules applicable in both the state and federal
courts, but that concern did not outweigh other concerns when variances
were deemed justified to accommodate Idaho practice.
M. Clark, Report of the Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, Introduction, pp.1-2
(1983).

As a result of the committee's expressed criteria, I.RE. 412(b)(2)(A) was

adopted and enacted in identical form to F.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A).
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have embraced
the premise that the Idaho Rules of Evidence be interpreted consistently with the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 273, 723 P.2d

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of a sex crime, reputation or opinion evidence of the
past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such sex crime is not
admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which
a person is accused of a sex crime, evidence of a victim's past sexual
behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible,
unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence is-

(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered
by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not,
with respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
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814, 817 (1986) ('The general rule of construction which this Court has adhered to
regarding the adoption of statutory language from another jurisdiction is that the
adoption of that language is presumed to be with that jurisdiction's prior interpretation
upon it"); State v. Caldero, 109 Idaho 80, 86, 705 P.2d 85, 91 (Ct. App. 1985) ("The
counterpart federal rule of evidence is identical.

It logically follows that the federal

limitation upon extrajudicial statements by coconspirators, which excludes statements
made during the 'concealment phase' of a conspiracy, should now apply in Idaho.").
Given the identical language employed by (then) F.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A) when l.R.E.
412(b )(2)(A) was adopted, this Court should interpret I. R. E. 412(b )(2)(A) consistently
with its federal counterpart, and hold that, in order to utilize the I. R. E. 412(b )(2)(A)
exception to the rape shield, a defendant must to trying to show that another person
was the source of a physical injury to the victim.
It makes sense that the language regarding evidence the defendant was not the
"source of semen or injury" in l.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A), like its federal counterpart, is limited
to physical injuries. The causes of physical injuries are much more easily determined
and segregated than are the causes of mental or emotional injuries, especially where,
as here, more than one person is alleged to have contributed to such injuries.

In

addition, the sources of physical injuries are generally exclusive of other sources of
injury.

Finally, mental or emotional harms are generally not included in the common

definition of "injury." (See Cambridge Dictionaries Online ("injury" is "physical harm or
damage

done

to

a

living

thing.");

website

http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/American-english/injury?q=injury.)
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address:

Orellana~Castro has failed to show any abuse of discretion by the district court's
denial of his motion to present evidence of G.O.'s alleged past sexual behavior under
I.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A). See Perry, 139 Idaho at 521, 81 P.3d at 1231.

E.

Even If The District Court Erred By Denying Orellana-Castro's Request To
Present Evidence Of G.O.' s Past Sexual Behavior Under I.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A),
The Error Was Harmless
Even if this Court concludes that the district court erred in denying Orellana-

Castro's request to present evidence, under I.R.E. 412(b)(2)(A), that Jose had drugged
and raped G.O., such error was harmless.
Where an error concerns evidence improperly excluded at trial, the test for
harmless error is whether there is a reasonable probably that the lack of the excluded
evidence contributed to the verdict. State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191,197, 16 P.3d 288,
294 (Ct. App. 2000). In this case, even if the district court erred in excluding testimony
that Jose had drugged and raped G.O. in October of 2011, there is no reasonable
probability that such error contributed to the verdict.
Even assuming that Jose drugged and raped G.O., and Orellana-Castro could
have provided evidence that the event caused her to suffer emotionally, such testimony
would not have tended to disprove that G.O. was also sexually abused by OrellanaCastro, her step-father, or that she was injured emotionally by his conduct. The cause
of G.O.'s emotional injuries are not necessarily exclusive to one person, and there is no
way a jury would be able to assign responsibility for who caused what type of injury, and
to what extent.

The jury was repeatedly informed that other events, including G.O.

witnessing her natural father physically abuse her mother when she was about five
years old, could have been responsible, at least in part, for the symptoms of post30

traumatic stress disorder and depression G.O. experienced.
L.22; p.503,

(Tr., p.482, L.6 - p.484,

14 - p.506, L.23; p.529, L. 15 - p.529, L.7; p.548, Ls.1-12; p.588, L.17 -

p.590, L.1 O; p.663, L.7

p.664, L.6; p.668, Ls.1-6.)

Neither would G.O.'s credibility

have been adversely affected by testimony that Jose raped her -- only an unreasonable
juror would discredit a victim's testimony just because she had been victimized by yet
another person.
Inasmuch as the jury had no reason to believe that G.O.'s emotional condition
was caused exclusively by one person, the jury clearly believed G.O.'s testimony that
Orellana-Castro sexually abused her, and the evidence of a rape of G.O. by Jose would
have done nothing to impact her credibility, the result of any error was harmless.

IV.
Orellana-Castro Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error
Orellana-Castro argues that, even if each of the instances of alleged error did not
amount individually to reversible error, "the district court's errors in his trial amounted to
actual errors depriving him of a fair trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.42.) Orellana-Castro's
argument fails because he has failed to show that the cumulative effect of errors
deprived him of a fair trial.
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez,
125 Idaho 445,453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of
the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131
Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998). The cumulative error analysis does not include
errors neither objected to nor found fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d
31

961, 982 (2010). Because Orellana-Castro cannot show any error, much less multiple
errors, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and sentence
entered upon the jury verdict finding Orellana-Castro guilty of four counts of sexual
abuse of a child under sixteen years of age.
DATED this 19th day of March, 2(\14.
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